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Abstract. Marcel Boumans’ Science outside the Laboratory revolves around the distinction 
between laboratory and field science, and the challenges that the latter faces in the 
measurement of scientific phenomena. Boumans raises a methodological puzzle, the 
possibility of reliable measurement in the field, and he gradually resolves it throughout an 
excursus in the history of science that brings to light episodes of methodological 
significance. The book starts with Oskar Morgenstern’s warning about the peril of scientific 
observation in economics; touches upon Gaussian’s theory of error and its uses in 
meteorology; discusses Haavelmo’s intuition about the problem of passive observation; and 
concludes with a survey of contemporary methods for aggregating experts’ judgments. 
Ultimately, Science outside the Laboratory  is a call for expert knowledge as a 
complementary source of evidence that, if carefully integrated with the traditional tools of 
field sciences, can eventually lead us to more reliable, and in this sense more objective, 
measurement. In what follows, I will first outline what I take to be the main theses of the 
book and discuss some of its main tenets. I will then illustrate some of the crucial steps in 
Boumans’ argument in detail. I will finally conclude with some general comments about 
the book. 
Keywords. Economic Thought, Economic methodology. 
JEL. A10, B30, B40. 
 
1. The Lab and the Field 
verall Science outside the Laboratory can be understood as a long 
argument aimed at defending two related theses. First, the ideal of 
scientific objectivity is worth pursuing not only in its “natural” domain, 
that is the laboratory, but also in the field, where it has often been regarded as 
unachievable. Rehabilitating scientific objectivity as a legitimate ideal in the field, 
however, should not come at the cost of denying the fundamental differences 
between the two domains. On the contrary, it is only by first acknowledging the 
differences that we can overcome the challenges that confront the pursuit of 
objectivity in the field. Second, the personal and subjective is part and parcel of 
scientific inquiry in the field; but, far from being an obstacle to that inquiry, it can 
further the accomplishment of the ideal of objectivity. In line with these theses, 
chapter after chapter Boumans builds a case for the necessity of the subjective to 
achieve eventually a form of objectivity. The construction of this argument reveals 
Boumans’ unconventional style and expertise, which combine the interest of the 
philosopher and the love for details that is typical of the historian. Indeed, while the 
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theses outlined above are never argued for in an explicit and systematic manner, 
Boumans does hint to the unavoidability of those conclusions through a number of 
case studies that unambiguously point in that direction.  
To understand Boumans’ argument and its implications, it might first be useful 
to spell out some of the assumptions that I believe lurk in the background of the 
discussion and remain to some extent implicit. As said at the very beginning of this 
article, the distinction between the lab and the field is the fil rouge throughout the 
book. Boumans sets himself up to the task of “developing an account of 
measurement for the field sciences” (p. 24), refers back to this distinction at 
different stages of his analysis, and interprets and assesses alternative approaches 
and authors in light of it. Despite its centrality, the character and reach of this 
distinction remain quite elusive. Boumans’ association of concepts, allusions, and 
examples to the distinction between lab and field is very liberal, and sometimes 
approximate. In my view the fundamental idea behind it is that, far from signaling 
a mere methodological distinction, the lab and the field are separate domains of 
inquiry where different types of phenomena are studied. Phenomena in the former 
domain of investigation, that is the lab, are liable to fall under the control of the 
investigator, and are thereby replicable. The scientist can tinker with the 
phenomenon, interfere with it, modify it, and eventually master it. By difference, 
phenomena in the field resist control and are not amenable to regimentation: 
scientists must thus surrender to their unreplicability.  
This admittedly minimalist definition enables us to understand why Boumans 
associates the lab with the natural sciences and the field with the social sciences. 
Even if the match is approximate, social phenomena, that is phenomena involving 
the human factor, undeniably tend to belong to, and make up most of, the latter 
domain of inquiry.  The human factor clearly complicates things further insofar as, 
unlike Nature, the social world is neither benevolent nor simple: Nature, says 
Boumans quoting Morgenstern, might hold back information, but she does not lie 
deliberately (p.8-9). Other interesting properties happen to emerge when 
phenomena can be regimented in such a way as to be rendered replicable. First, by 
creating the conditions under which the phenomenon repeats itself, one makes it 
also amenable to law-like descriptions. Furthermore, once empirical regularities 
start populating our domain of investigation, it is likely to become easier to 
theorize in a principled and systematic way about it. Finally, tinkering and 
interfering with the phenomenon, that is intervening (Hacking, 1983), is a 
prominent strategy to bring about change, and thus a powerful way to start building 
up causal knowledge. 
In my view, Boumans understands the field as the lieu where, since phenomena 
are less than mastered regularities are quasi-law-like, measurement is inaccurate, 
our theories are incomplete, and causal knowledge is likely spurious. The field falls 
short of objectivity because error is pervasive in the senses defined above. Aiming 
at objectivity as an ideal thus involves finding strategies to reduce error (that is, 
making our measurements more accurate), define more precisely the scope of our 
empirical regularities, and reduce the incompleteness of our theories.  In seeing 
science in the field as a departure from exactness, Boumans’ view is not very 
distant from that of Oskar Morgenstern, John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Marshall. The 
main respects in which he differs from the authors above is probably his belief that 
knowledge that is subjective, or personal, not only is not a hindrance, but can 
actually help the pursuit of objectivity as an ideal. Whereas his predecessors might 
have been somehow open to this idea, they never fully embraced it. This is instead 
Boumans’ solution: “The question is not how to exclude subjective judgment, but 
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While the first part of the book is a preliminary methodological discussion of 
measurement in the field, the bulk of Boumans’ argument is explicated in chapters 
4, 5, and 6. Here, Boumans tries to vindicate his account by showing us that: 
traditional strategies of measurement in the field have proven insufficient to 
eliminate error; arguments that dispute the validity of subjective judgments are 
highly controversial and ultimately weak; and there are positive reasons in favor of 
subjective judgments as a complementary strategy for reducing error in the field. 
As already mentioned, Boumans’ argumentative strategy is rather unconventional. 
It has a strongly historicist flavor while retaining an obviously prescriptive 
component. The argument hangs on a number of methodological considerations 
that are illustrated rather than proven. This represents somehow a challenge for the 
reader who sometimes feels like staring at a moving target. It is however clear that 
Boumans is not drawing conclusions through systematic derivation from a set of 
principles; and, moreover, to gauge his analysis according to these standards would 
be misguided. Rather, Boumans opts for what I would call a casuistic. In other 
words, he constructs cases directed to extract a methodological lesson from a 
historical episode.  
These cases back up the crucial steps in his reasoning.  Boumans thus makes a 
case for the pervasiveness of error in the field sciences. He makes a case for the 
validity of clinical judgments. He makes a case for the relevance of expert 
knowledge for achieving an error-free field science. In what follows, I will briefly 
review some of these cases to give the reader a sense of what to expect when 
engaging with Boumans’ work. 
 
2. The Problem of Passive Observation 
Boumans discusses the problem of passive observation in the context of an 
exchange between Jan Tinbergen and Trygve Haavelmo in the late-Thirties and 
early-Forties of the past century. The exchange revolves around the problem of 
how to establish the causal significance of a variable by means of linear regression 
models. In particular, the problem is whether, and to what extent, the notion of 
influence (the variable coefficient) and strength of influence (the coefficient time 
the standard deviation) are valid constructs for causal significance. In his work for 
the League of Nations, Tinbergen concluded that the rate of interest had at best a 
negligible explanatory power on investments based on the value of these constructs 
being not significantly different from zero. Haavelmo, however, regarded this 
conclusion as erroneous: he pointed out how this fact could be simply a 
consequence of the limited variation of the variable in question (the rate of interest) 
in the time interval represented in the data. Haavelmo then generalized this 
problem by introducing a distinction between factual and potential influence of a 
causal variable.  
We can understand the factual influence of a variable as its explanatory power 
with respect to the outcome of interest in a given data set. Potential influence is the 
variation we would observe in the outcome had the variable changed in a 
controlled environment. What we are ultimately interested in is the potential 
influence, which we take as capturing the real causal structure underlying the data. 
However, we can only know about the potential influence of a variable through its 
factual influence, as the former cannot be directly observed whereas the latter 
actually can. Haavelmo convincingly demonstrated how imperfect a guide the 
latter is to the former. Mere absence of variation in the current data set might in 
fact lead us to the erroneous conclusion that the variable in question has at best a 
negligible causal influence on the outcome because its factual influence would turn 
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We can now see how salient the problem of passive observation is for 
measurement in the field as it incarnates, and thus exemplifies, the limits of any 
method germane to it. This case makes the point that there is a fundamental 
difference between how data are generated in the lab, the lieu of so to speak “active 
observation”, and how they are obtained in the field, the lieu of “passive 
observation”; and this fact has crucial consequences for what these data are 
evidence for. Moreover, insofar as we are interested in the underlying causal 
structure and we cannot manipulate it directly, passive observation (in all its forms) 
turns out to be a fallible strategy because it cannot possibly provide direct 
information about that causal structure. In other words, the evidence that more 
securely would take us closer to our epistemic goal, that is evidence of 
counterfactual dependence, is evidence we can only (or best) fabricate in the lab. 
What we harvest in the field is at best its imperfect surrogate.  
Thus, it seems that Boumans does make a point. How strong a point is it, 
though? Even though the severity of the problem of passive observation is 
uncontroversial, it certainly loses some of its dramatic impact once we inscribe it 
within the more general issue of under-determination. Roughly, theory is under-
determined by the data whenever the empirical evidence at our disposal is 
compatible with a multiplicity of hypotheses and thus insufficient to discriminate 
among those. In this case, the factual influence of a variable being close to zero in 
the data is compatible with at least two rival hypotheses. The causal (potential) 
influence is also negligible and the causal influence is significant though obscured 
in the data for some reasons. Under-determination of theory by data is a long 
known, and discussed, phenomenon. While it certainly is a pervasive phenomenon 
in the field, the lab is not immune from it. Actually, it is exactly in the latter 
context that the physicist Pierre Duhem first discussed it.
2
  Thus understood, the 
problem of passive observation becomes a less compelling case because, once 
reformulated in slightly more abstract terms, it challenges the distinction it was 
initially meant to underpin. 
   
3. On the (Ir)Rationality of Human Judgments 
In chapter 5, Boumans introduces the notion of judgment and distinguishes 
between rational judgments and considered judgments. The distinction becomes 
meaningful once we consider that to find solutions to real life problems agents 
model the situations they face. Rational judgments are assessments of the 
probability of a certain occurrence formulated against the background of a 
probabilistic model. We thus speak of a judgment as rational vis-à-vis a given 
model: provided the model is correct the judgment it licenses is rational if valid. 
Considered judgments (aka clinical, human, or Kantian judgments) express the 
adequacy of a given model to represent the problem faced in a certain situation. 
They thus rely on a broader set of considerations that, among other facts, take into 
account the specifics of the case. This distinction enables Boumans to raise the 
following points. Each situation can be conceptualized as a different problem by 
using different models. Hence, rational judgments are correct or mistaken only 
within a given model; in other words, different models elicit different rational 
judgments. Furthermore, it might be the case that there is no unique, or uniquely 
justified, solution to the problem of what is the right model for a given situation.  
Boumans illustrates these points by way of rather detailed case studies. The “hot 
hand” case revisits the debate about whether hot hands among basketball players 
do exist or are merely a cognitive illusion. It shows how people model differently 
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the same simple real-life situation and thereby achieve different rational judgments. 
The Monty Hall case tells us how the popular problem of “the three doors” has 
kept the discussion alive for decades without leading to an agreed-upon solution. 
Hence, besides showing as the former case does that there are different ways of 
modeling the same real-life problem, it also points out that there is no obvious 
solution to what the best model for a given situation is. Unlike the Monty Hall 
case, the case of medical judgments shows that even though different rational 
judgments of the same situation are simultaneously possible, sometimes a model is 
best suited than others to a given real-life problem. Whether this is the case 
depends on how considered the judgments formulated in its support are. In this 
way Boumans convincingly shows that practitioners themselves can be in the 
position of formulating considered judgments reliably. 
Let me spend a few words on this interesting case. The “Harvard Medical 
School Test” has been used to conclude that physicians often suffer of what is 
known in the literature as the base-rate fallacy. The test proves that when assessing 
the probability of a given outcome, for example the chance that a person found to 
have a positive test result actually has the disease, physicians erroneously overlook 
the base rate or pre-test probability. Their judgments thus count as irrational if 
assessed according to the Bayesian model for revising beliefs in light of new 
evidence. However, a more detailed analysis of the practice shows that physicians’ 
responses are compatible with the use of heuristics that are tailored to the situations 
the practitioner typically faces when formulating this type of decision. In 
particular, these heuristics are developed on the basis of complex models of 
decision making (e.g. the threshold model by Pauker and Kassirer), which take into 
consideration crucial pieces of information such as the risk and benefits of 
administering medical tests like biopsy. Treating these judgments as irrational 
because they are not in line with Bayesian reasoning is thus misconceived since the 
relevant model behind the heuristics in use is a different one.  
Boumans seems to draw the additional conclusion that “the kind of subjective 
knowledge that is needed to complement objective knowledge is knowledge that is 
not crystallized in models and is personal. It is knowledge that is part of Karl 
Popper’s “World 2”: the mental or psychological world, the world of our feelings 
of pain and pleasure, of our thoughts, of our decisions, of our perceptions and our 
observations; in other words, the world of our mental or psychological states or 
processes or of subjective experiences (p.147). I found these assertions rather 
puzzling. In my view what the case above shows is that the “subjectivity” of 
practical reasoning —for example, in medical decision-making—is anything but 
personal (in the sense above). It is instead practice-related knowledge embodied in 
heuristics, the effectiveness and rationality of which is testified by the model from 
which the heuristics originated. The heuristics thus codify background knowledge 
that needs not be entirely appropriated by the individual agent. This fact, however, 
does not make it part of our mental or psychological states. It does require, though, 
that it be validated in different modes, and invites us to inquire about the model 
behind the heuristics and the process through which the latter originated from the 
former.   
 
4. Conclusion Remarks 
Science outside the Laboratory can be seen as a solution to another problem that 
had a lasting influence on the philosophical debate about field science in the past 
decades. That is the primordial tension between theory and observation. Boumans 
restates the old learned lesson that the field sciences have theoretical weaknesses 
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seems decisively skeptical of the theoretical alternative. Despite the plea of early 
econometricians, it is not at all clear where knowledge of fundamental causal 
structures can eventually be found. On the other hand, he seems to suggest that the 
solution to the problem cannot be empirical (read statistical) either. The data we 
collect in the field depend on the whims of Nature; moreover, there is no reason to 
expect that Nature’s experiments would meet our epistemic need, if not by sheer 
chance. His case of passive observation is, after all, devoted to illuminate exactly 
this point. The impasse Boumans describes seems as real and threatening as ever. 
In this debate, Boumans wisely leans towards some form of epistemic modesty 
and mild empiricism. If theories are incomplete and data insufficient to retrieve the 
nomological machine responsible for their creation, maybe we should revise our 
epistemic ambitions. Maybe the data we have should be used to establish local 
regularities, that is, regularities that hold quite robustly for only a limited set of 
circumstances. And we should forget altogether about nomological machines. This 
idea is saliently captured by the notion of grey boxes (p. 50-52). Grey boxes are an 
intermediate between black and white boxes. A white box is a set of causal-
descriptive statements on how a real system actually operates. Grey boxes are 
modular designed models where the modules are black boxes. Unlike white boxes, 
grey boxes do not require direct test of the causal structure. They instead test the 
causal structure indirectly through stress test, extreme-conditions test, or test the 
model capacity to replicate the data through behavior tests.  
Boumans’ message resonates well with several other positions in philosophy 
and in the sciences. It is enough to mention notions such as mechanism in the 
former camp (Elster, 1998) or guiding principles such as the Marschak’s Maxim in 
the latter (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). Both have 
experienced increasing popularity in the last decades and both embody, in my 
view, some form of epistemic modesty and mild empiricism. This fact certainly 
provides additional plausibility to Boumans’ take on the issue. However, it also 
adds to the feeling of surprise when one comes to glimpse the avenue he eventually 
pursues. As Boumans aptly acknowledges, Kevin Hoover makes a plea for a 
strikingly similar position when asserting that the goal of econometrics is to 
discover facts generated by unobservable nomological machines, but that do not 
presuppose knowledge of those machines (Hoover, 2002). If we look at the 
contemporary debate in econometrics, what we see is not only the harsh debate 
between so-called structuralists and experimentalists. We also see attempts at 
“building bridges” between the two sides that arguably respond to the Marshak’s 
Maxim mentioned above (Heckman, 2010).  
For some unexplained reason, however, this option is not contemplated by 
Boumans. His solution is searched elsewhere in the partly unexplored resources of 
expert knowledge. Thus we can say that Boumans’ solution to the old dilemma 
between theory and observation consists in the advocacy of some form of 
methodological pluralism. We find the current methods wanting and we 
supplement their shortcomings by integrating the evidence they provide with 
evidence from other sources. This is certainly a plausible strategy and it would be 
interesting to see how it would play out more concretely. However, this is not the 
only solution and not necessarily the best. The examples above show that the 
dilemma can be overcome so to speak “from within”. Each discipline might have 
its own, maybe yet unexplored, resources to move beyond the sharp opposition 
between theory-driven and data-driven practice, as Heckman’s case illustrates. If 
we followed this route we might also end up advocating some form of pluralism, 
but it would be pluralism with a different face. For example, it might be based on 
the intuition that results are not commensurable across methods but should be 
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Overall Science outside the Laboratory presents an overarching narrative that I 
find rather convincing and in a way original. The book provokes contradictory 
feelings in the reader, though. It is extremely rich in details that sometimes provide 
unexpected insights and other times blur the narrative. Sometimes the reader finds 
himself asking for more clarity and precision; yet, he may be captivated by the 
vividness of the narration. It is a challenging book that deserves credit for the 
salience of its theses and the originality of its style. It also deserves credit for 
another message that it, maybe unintendedly but forcefully, advocates. Boumans’ 
craftsmanship brings to the fore the inherent complexity of the scientific practice 
against any easy stereotype that some philosophers, and sometimes scientists 
themselves, might be inclined to build. In particular, it shows that the rationality of 
scientific judgment, which isn’t always immediately apparent to the external 
observer (and by this, I mean any observer that is an outsider to the particular 
scientific community), can be found in the specific blend of experience, codified 
practice, and “local” judgments that characterizes the work of the scientific 
practitioner. Boumans’ contribution consists in showing at a painstaking level of 
detail where the solidity of these judgments rest. In this sense, we can say that his 
call for expert knowledge is thereby vindicated inch by inch. 
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